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Summary
International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean
Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement,
which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The
paper analyses this problem from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory and
proposes two different solutions to the cooperation problem. The first analyses the
potential role of national environmental authorities in facilitating credible commitment of
the project host operating under its jurisdiction. It is argued that the threat of punishing the
project host if he breaches the contract may serve this purpose. The effective level of
punishment is derived. The second option involves strategic delegation of contract
implementation to a third party operating under the same jurisdiction as the project host.
Again, the paper explores the conditions that ensure incentive-compatibility. Both options
are based on the idea that the project sponsor may commit himself credibly by becoming a
Stackelberg leader.
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Non-Technical Summary
The Kyoto Protocol on climate change stipulates that industrialised countries and
countries with economies in transition (“Annex I Parties”) shall reduce their overall
emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the first
commitment period 2008 to 2012. In order to fulfil these commitments in a cost-efficient
way, Annex I countries may use the Kyoto mechanisms “Joint Implementation” (JI),
“Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM), and “International Emissions Trading” (IET).
The basic idea of the Kyoto mechanisms refers to the possibility of producing
abroad (JI or CDM) and/or importing (IET) the emission reductions necessary to meet the
emission reduction or limitation targets of individual countries, sectors or firms. This
possibility enhances overall efficiency since differentials in abatement cost between
countries, sectors and greenhouse gas emitting companies are exploited.
A fundamental problem associated with the effectiveness and stability of
international JI/CDM contracts arises from the fact that international contracts are difficult
to enforce because they are made between entities that fall under the jurisdiction of distinct
sovereign states. This paper investigates strategies to cope with this problem from a game
theoretic perspective.
The first section gives a brief idea of the Kyoto Mechanisms. The second section
analyses the fundamental problem of international JI/CDM contracts by modelling them as
a non-cooperative, simultaneous one-shot game. The two players represent a JI/CDM
project sponsor and the foreign project host that implements the JI/CDM project,
respectively. It is shown that without any specific provisions against breach of contract,
both JI/CDM contract parties will renege on their respective contractual obligations by
behaving non-cooperatively. Consequently, the JI/ CDM project will not be realised and
the associated efficiency gains are not seized.
The third section analyses how to design institutions and strategies that credibly
commit both JI/CDM contract parties to meet their contractual obligations by behaving
cooperatively. One option for stabilising the JI/CDM contract focuses on the potential role
of national environmental authorities. It is explored if they could provide a mechanism by
which potential JI/CDM project sponsors could credibly commit to cooperative behaviour.III
It is argued that national environmental authorities indeed may serve this function by
penalising breaches of JI/CDM contracts on the part of the contract party belonging to its
jurisdiction. The paper derives the minimal required level of the penalty.
Another option involves sequential moving on the one hand, and on the other
hand strategic delegation of contract fulfilment to an agent who plays the JI/CDM game on
behalf of the project host. The delegation arrangement is fixed by a binding contract
between the principal, i.e. the JI/CDM project host, and an agent. The paper derives
conditions that allow the implementation of the cooperative solution of the modified
JI/CDM game. These conditions refer to the incentive-compatible payment to the agent.IV
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„In conclusion, while ... enforcement mechanisms
will play a key role in JI under the FCCC,
 careful reporting and inspection systems
seem for the time being to be the maximum achievable.“
[SCHRIJVER (1995), S. 140]
1. The Kyoto Mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December ’97, provides that industrialised
countries and countries with economies in transition (“Annex I Parties”) shall reduce their
overall emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the
first commitment period 2008 to 2012. In order to fulfil these commitments in a cost-
efficient way, Annex I countries may use the Kyoto mechanisms “Joint Implementation”
(JI), “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM), and “International Emissions Trading”
(IET).
The basic idea of these instruments refers to the possibility of producing abroad
and/or importing the emission credits needed to meet the emission commitment of
individual countries, sectors and companies. Since mitigation of global warming is
independent from the spatial distribution of greenhouse gas emission abatement efforts, the
overall environmental effectiveness is not reduced by this internationalisation of abatement
activities. However, since abatement costs differ significantly across countries, sectors,
firms and plants, the use of the Kyoto mechanisms may lead to huge cost savings or profit
opportunities at firm level, and corresponding welfare gains at the aggregate national and
international level.
JI projects are international projects „aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions
by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any
sector of the economy“ (article 6). Both, the sponsor country and the host country are
required to belong to the group of Annex I Parties. JI projects may be realised by legal
entities operating under the jurisdiction of Annex I Parties.2
In substance, CDM projects are very similar to JI projects. Again, private entities
may participate in CDM projects. The main difference between JI and CDM refers to the
requirement that host countries of CDM projects shall be members of the group of non-
Annex I Parties (i.e. developing countries). Another important difference relates to the fact
that, in contrast to JI, forest projects are not (yet) explicitly eligible for CDM projects.
IET refers to the acquisition and the transfer of emission credits or permits
between countries with legally binding and quantified emission limitation or reduction
objectives (essentially the group of Annex-I-Parties). The Kyoto Protocol does not
explicitly mention the participation of the private sector. However, it is implicitly assumed
that IET should be designed especially for private sector participation. In this case, distinct
companies that have quantitative emission targets may transfer and acquire emission
permits, which previously have been allocated or devolved to them by respective national
authorities. A firm that over-complies may transfer permits to another company that uses
these transferred permits to get into compliance.
A convincing distinction between JI and IET is not so easy to make. Both forms
refer to international cooperation between countries with legally binding emission
reduction or limitation targets. Several distinctions have been proposed. Some proposals
consider JI as being an imperfect substitute for IET, which might lead to the conclusion
that the importance of JI will diminish and eventually disappear as IET develops. A more
convincing distinction, which will be used in this paper, is the following: JI simply refers
to the international production of emission credits involving international investments,
whereas IET represents international trade in emission credits. In this interpretation, JI and
IET are rather complementary to each other than JI being an imperfect substitute for IET:
The emission credits produced abroad by means of JI may be marketed internationally via
IET, thus enhancing the liquidity of the market. Hence, the various proposals for
establishing organised markets for IET will rather promote than jeopardise the
development of a viable JI (and CDM) regime.
Several questions related to the practical implementation of the Kyoto
mechanisms are presently discussed in the political and academic debate.
1 The list of
unresolved problems on the political agenda seems endless. Amongst the more important
                                                          
1 See e.g. Goldemberg (ed.) (1998), Matsuo (1998), or Missfeldt (1998). The political agenda regarding the
elaboration of rules and guidelines for the Kyoto Mechanisms, which is part of the so-called Buenos Aires
action plan, is contained in UNFCCC (1998).3
ones, they include the determination of the amount of additional emission reductions, i.e.
emission credits, obtained by JI or CDM projects („baseline issue“, „environmental
additionality“), and the design of efficient and effective compliance mechanisms.
2
The design of appropriate enforcement mechanisms for JI and CDM contracts has
rather been neglected in the political and academic debate. This is surprising, since JI and
CDM projects are especially burdened with enforcement problems that arise due to the fact
that international contracts are made between entities that fall under the jurisdiction of
distinct sovereign states. This problem is aggravated by the fact that JI/CDM contracts
involve an inherent long-term relationship between the contract partners. The purpose of
this paper is to analyse the problem of enforcing JI and CDM contracts, and to discuss
possible solutions, based on a game-theoretic approach.
3
The next section describes the problem of enforcing JI and CDM contracts putting
it into a game-theoretic framework. Since international contracts de facto are rather non-
binding due to the involvement of sovereign countries, a non-cooperative approach is used.
In the third section two different mechanisms for removing inherent enforcement
problems are discussed. Both proposals are based on the idea that at least one party of a
JI/CDM contract can credibly commit himself to fulfil his contract obligations by moving
first. Doing so, however he expects the other party to meet his contract obligations, too.
The paper discusses two different mechanisms that indeed would enable a credible
commitment by the second party. Firstly, a sanction mechanism at the national level is
proposed. Secondly, strategic delegation of contract fulfilment may provide a credible self-
commitment strategy.
                                                          
2 Regarding compliance mechanisms for an international climate treaty see e.g. Heister et al. (1997).
3 The problem of enforcing international contracts involving sovereign countries has attracted much attention
in economics. Eaton and Fernandez (1995) or Mohr (1991a) analyse international debt relations. Staiger
(1995) focuses on international trade. Thomas and Worrall (1994) explore international direct investments.
International environmental agreements are examined e.g. by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993),
Mohr (1995) and (1991b), or Mohr and Thomas (1998). Schmidt (1998) provides a survey of the latter
research field.4
2. Country Sovereignty as Reason for Unstable JI and CDM
Contracts
JI/CDM projects are economically viable if marginal abatement costs of the
JI/CDM projects considered are lower than those of alternative projects in the sponsor
country are. The realisation of these cost differentials leads to efficiency gains, or
economic surplus, associated with JI/CDM projects, and is the main rational for engaging
in JI/CDM activities. If such efficiency gains are realised, both the project sponsor and the
project host will benefit: The project sponsor will benefit because he is able to meet a
given emission reduction obligation at lower costs. The project host will benefit by sharing
in the economic surplus generated by the exploitation of existing cost differentials.
4 Due to
liberty to make a contract, the existence of such benefits on both sides is a precondition for
entering into JI/CDM contracts. In game-theoretic terms, the participation or individual
rationality constraints have to be fulfilled.
Entering into the contract does not automatically lead to its implementation. For
the actual implementation of the JI/CDM project it is decisive that the obligations assumed
are de facto binding and enforceable. However, international contracts, as compared to
national contracts, are in general difficult to enforce by compulsion due to sovereignty of
states. In principle, this fact applies also to international JI/CDM contracts.
For this reason, the design of JI/CDM contracts should not only ensure that both
parties might benefit from the project. Furthermore, the contract should be designed in
such a way that both parties do have permanent incentives to abide voluntarily by the
contract. In this case, the contract is self-enforcing. In game-theoretic terms, the incentive
compatibility constraints of the JI/CDM contract should be fulfilled. The consideration of
the incentive compatibility constraints of JI/CDM contracts is essential for the actual
performance of JI/CDM projects, and the development of stable JI/CDM regimes.
Surprisingly, it has attracted only minor attention in the present debate.
                                                          
4 The concrete sharing scheme will depend on the structure of the JI/CDM project market and the bargaining
power of the parties [Mohr (1996), Siniscalco, Goria and Janssen (1998)]. The project host may also benefit
from secondary effects like technology transfer or improvement of local or national environmental
conditions.5
The basic structure of the problem may be analysed by the following simple game
between the JI/CDM investor and the JI/CDM host. Due to observed prevalence of non-
enforceable international contracts, this game is non-cooperative by definition. For
analytical motives it is assumed for the time being that both parties decide simultaneously
and in a one-shot manner about keeping to, or breaking of the contract. Furthermore,
complete information is assumed.
The index  ) (H S  denotes the sponsor (the host). Both players can choose between
two actions or strategies.
5 On the one hand they can behave cooperatively abiding by the
terms of the contract: The investor makes available the funds required as stipulated by the
contract (
S C ).
6 The host adopts the measures as stipulated by the contract (
H C ). Since the
contract de facto is non-binding, both parties have the possibility to breach the contract:
The investor could refuse the payment of the agreed funds (
S D ), whereas the host could
refrain from adopting the measures required producing the emission credits (
H D ).
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Figure 1: The JI/CDM game
                                                          
5 In general, the game-theoretic concepts of “action” and “strategy” have two distinct meanings. However, in
simultaneous one-shot games they are identical.
6 C denotes cooperation, whereas D denotes defection.6
This game has four different outcomes:
1) The project host and the project sponsor meet their contract obligations.
This outcome is the purpose of the contract. The project sponsor provides
the agreed funds  Q . The project host adopts the measures necessary to
produce additional emission reductions and bears respective incremental
implementation costs 
CDM JI C
/ . The additional emission reductions
generated by the project are transferred to the investor who gets credited
these emission credits by the national environmental authority towards his
domestic emission reduction obligations. For example, these obligations
may involve carbon taxes. In this case, the corresponding reduction of the
tax base, or carbon tax reimbursement D T represents the return of the
JI/CDM investment.
2) Neither the project host, nor the project sponsor abides by the contract.
Since the project is not implemented, no incremental costs of the JI/CDM
project 
CDM JI C
/  arise. The investor does not receive any emission credits
because no additional emission reductions are generated. Consequently, he
has to pay the full carbon tax, or does not receive any tax reimbursement
D T.
3) The project host does not abide by the contract, whereas the project sponsor
does. This outcome is possible due to the assumption of simultaneous
decisions and moves. The investor provides the agreed funds  Q , but does
not receive any emission credits. Consequently, besides providing the
project funds he is also obliged to pay the full carbon tax, or equivalently,
does not receive any tax reimbursement D T. Since the host does not
implement the project he does not bear any incremental project costs
CDM JI C
/ , but obtains the JI/CDM investment funds  Q .
4) The project host meets his contract obligations whereas the project sponsor
breaches the contract. In this case, the host implements the JI/CDM project
and bears the incremental project costs 
CDM JI C
/ , but does not receive any
investment funds. Supposing that the national environmental authority is7
only interested in the environmental performance of the project, the investor
receives the carbon tax reimbursement D T, since the project actually has
generated additional emission reductions. Possible consequences of a
modification of this assumption are discussed in the next section.
How will the players of the game, i.e. the JI/CDM contract parties behave? Or in
other words, which outcome represents the equilibrium of the game? In order to answer
this question it is necessary to specify the level of the investment payment  Q . For this
purpose the two participation constraints are used: Due to liberty of entering into contracts,
both parties will sign the contract only if they are better off as compared to non-
cooperation. This requires in the present case that the following participation constraints
need to be met [ () ￿
l U  denotes the utility of players  , , , S H l l =  as a function of the
outcome of the game]:
(1) ( ) ( )
H S S H S S D D U T C C U , 0 , = ‡ D + Q - =
(2) ( ) ( )
S H H CDM JI S H H D D U C C C U , 0 ,
/ = ‡ - Q =
Designing the contract, rational parties will take into account these individual
rationality constraints. Rearranging equation (1) yields:
(3)  Q ‡ DT
This participation constraint of the sponsor requires that the investment payment
to the project host should be lower than the carbon tax reimbursement that he will get
surrendering to his national environmental authority the emission credits produced.




This is the participation constraint of the project host. It requires that the
investment payment from the sponsor should at least cover the incremental costs of the
JI/CDM project.
Putting together both participation restrictions (3) and (4) makes clear that the
investment payment should be in the following interval:
(5)
CDM JI C T
/ ‡ Q ‡ D
Frequently it is assumed that the investment payment equals the incremental costs
[ ]
CDM JI C
/ = Q . This, however, is only true if the bargaining or market power is
completely with the sponsor such that he can seize the entire efficiency gain. This situation
can be considered as rather being an exception.
7
Having determined the possible range of the investment payment  Q , and
applying the concept of Nash equilibrium, it is easy to show that the solution of this non-
cooperative JI/CDM game is represented by the combination  ( )
S H D D , .
8 In Nash
equilibrium, each player‘s choice is a best response to the strategies actually played by his
rivals. In the present case, besides being a Nash equilibrium the solution of this game is in
fact an equilibrium in dominant strategies: The sponsor‘s best strategy is the non-
cooperative action  ( )
S D  since this yields the highest pay-off independently of the actual
choice of the project host. Also the project host‘s best choice is contract breach  ( )
H D
independently of the sponsor‘s choice. Since for both players the non-cooperative strategy
is the best one, both the host and the sponsor will breach the contract even if contract
fulfilment on both sides would increase the individual utility. Hence, the JI/CDM game
represents an inefficient prisoner‘s dilemma.
Central question is now, how to prevent this sub-optimal outcome? At first glance,
it seems reasonable to suppose that a modification of the static framework of the inherent
long-term relationship between the sponsor and the host may alleviate the cooperation
problem: Assuming a repeated interaction between both parties could create an incentive to
cooperate since the long-term benefits of meeting the obligations could outweigh the short-
                                                          
7 See Janssen and Mohr (1998), Mohr (1996), Siniscalco, Goria and Janssen (1998).
8 Using the concept of Nash equilibrium, the possibility of renegotiations is neglected. Hence, renegotiation
stability [Farrell and Maskin (1989) or Van Damme (1989)] is not considered.9
term benefit of breaching the contract. Both players could base their future behaviour on
the observed past behaviour of the rival.
Unfortunately, this supposition is wrong. If both players have a finite time horizon
and complete information, and if the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous one-shot game
is unique, then repeated interaction will not change non-cooperative behaviour into
cooperative behaviour. The reason for this basic result of game theory may be illustrated
by backward induction: In the last round of a finitely repeated game, both players have an
incentive to defect, independently of each other‘s previous behaviour. In the last but one
round, cooperation is only attractive if rewarded by cooperation in the next round. But,
since in the last round both players in any case behave non-cooperatively, rewarding of
cooperative behaviour in the last but one round is not possible. For this reason, no party
will behave cooperatively in the last but one round. This argumentation may be carried on
up to the first round.
Based on this analysis, the question arises if cooperation problems associated with
international JI/CDM projects will inevitably lead to unstable JI/CDM regimes? This
question will be addressed in the next section.
3. Institutions and Strategies for Stabilising JI and CDM
Contracts
In the previous section the basic problem of breach of international JI/CDM
contracts has been exposed. The solution of this problem is essential for the
implementation of an effective and efficient JI/CDM regime. The purpose of this section is
to analyse possible institutions and strategies for stabilising JI/CDM contracts.
In the case of non-binding contracts, cooperative behaviour of the parties may be
generated by an incentive-compatible contract design. In general, an incentive-compatible
contract design comprises specific rules regarding the fulfilment of the contract
obligations. Such specific rules may be interpreted as institutional elements of international
JI/CDM contracts. This interpretation of institutions is based on the following definition
(North, 1994, p. 360):10
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour,
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics.”
In this sense, the present section analyses aspects of the institutional design
required for the successful implementation of JI/CDM projects.
3.1 Commitment of the Sponsor by Advanced Payment
The basic problem of the JI/CDM game analysed in the previous section is the
inability of both contract parties to credibly commit to cooperative behaviour. The
resulting instability and inefficiency of the JI/CDM contract, i.e. the breach of contract on
both sides, can be removed if both parties can adopt mechanisms for a credible
commitment.
A first step in this direction may consist in deferred or sequential fulfilment of the
contract obligations. In this case, the first-moving player becomes a Stackelberg leader.
This constitutes a credible commitment because the second player, i.e. the Stackelberg
follower, can base his own behaviour on the observable behaviour of the Stackelberg
leader. If the later does not comply, the former too has the possibility to behave non-
cooperatively.
This sequential fulfilment of contract obligations makes it possible for the
Stackelberg leader to commit credibly, since his behaviour is observable. However, the
second player is still faced with the problem of credible commitment. Obviously, the first
player is not willing to become the Stackelberg leader if the second player is not successful
in adopting a mechanism for credibly committing himself. Hence, the development of a
commitment mechanism for the second player is a precondition for the first player
becoming a Stackelberg leader. This issue will be dealt with in the next subsection.
Another problem refers to the question who of the two parties should become the
leader and who the follower? In the present case, the temporal sequencing of action doesn’t11
seem to be predetermined by a “natural” structure.
9 In principle, both parties could move
first, leaving the task of developing a commitment mechanism to the other side. In the
following it is assumed that the project sponsor is moving first, becoming the Stackelberg
leader. Hence, the focus of the next subsection’s analysis is on mechanisms by which the
project host can commit himself in a credible manner. It should be emphasised, however,
that also the reverse structure is possible and plausible.
3.2 Commitment Strategies of the Project Host
In this subsection possible mechanisms for a credible commitment of the project
host are analysed. Following strategies are discussed: On the one hand, the paper explores
the possible role of the national environmental authority of the host’s country in facilitating
credible commitment of the project host. On the other hand, it is examined if the host could
achieve a credible commitment delegating strategically the implementation of the project
to an agent.
3.2.1 Punishment of Breaches of Contract by the National
Environmental Authority
Until now it has been implicitly assumed that the national environmental agency
in the host country serves only the following functions:
¤ Verification if the JI/CDM project actually generates additional emission
reductions.
¤ If the result of verification is positive, transfer of the emission credits
obtained to the investor and corresponding registration of the transfer on the
national account of greenhouse gas emissions.
                                                          
9 This is e.g. the case considering the supply decision of a monopolist as a Stackelberg game: The monopolist
moves first fixing the profit-maximising supply price by taking into account the reaction function of the rival
“demand side”, i.e. the demand function. Afterwards the Stackelberg follower, i.e. the demand side, decides
about the optimal demand quantity.12
National environmental authorities may play an additional role concerning the
implementation of successful JI/CDM projects: By means of establishing an appropriate
mechanisms by which possible breaches of contract by the project host are punished, the
national environmental authority may facilitate a credible commitment of the project host.
What is an appropriate punishment mechanism? The previous discussion made
clear that the project host is unable to commit himself in a credible manner since non-
cooperative behaviour makes him better off independently of the sponsor’s behaviour. This
problem can be removed if the national environmental authority imposes a punishment on
the project host in case of non-cooperative behaviour. The level of this punishment Y
should be fixed at a level that allows the host to signal a credible commitment. In this case,
the project sponsor rightly assumes that the project host will abide by the contract. Hence,
he is willing to move first behaving cooperatively.
The appropriate level of punishment Y may be easily determined by the pay off
matrix of the JI/CDM game (see figure 1): If the project sponsor behaves cooperatively, a
breach of contract on the part of the project host is (strictly) disadvantageous as compared
to cooperative behaviour, if the following condition is met:
(6) ( ) ( )
S H H CDM JI S H H C D U C C C U , ,
/ = Y - Q > - Q =
( )
S H H C D U ,  denotes the host‘s utility level in the situation in which the sponsor
complies, but the host doesn‘t and consequently gets punished by the national




This condition requires that the national environmental authority should fix the
punishment at a level which is higher that the incremental costs of the project. However,
since the incremental costs of the JI/CDM project are not directly observable, and since the
host may have an incentive not to reveal this strategically important variable, the national
environmental authority may have some problems to fix the punishment at a level, which is
effective and credible. However, since the incremental costs are in any case lower than the
monetary value of the emission credits produced, i.e. the corresponding carbon tax13
reimbursement D T to the project sponsor [see condition (5)], and since this variable is
easily observable, an effective punishment could be fixed at the level
(8) T D = Y .
This punishment rule is indeed incentive-compatible as the following summary of
the entire mechanisms makes clear:
1) Greenhouse gas emitting companies faced with some kind of reduction
obligation may invest in JI/CDM projects and credit resulting additional
emission reductions towards their domestic reduction obligations, e.g. a
carbon tax. The governments of the sponsor and host country have signed a
respective cooperation agreement.
2) Besides usual monitoring, accounting and reporting functions, the national
environmental authority of the host country develops the rule that project
hosts who do not comply with the obligations as stipulated by the JI/CDM
contract have to pay a punishment which equals the missed tax
reimbursement on the part of the project sponsor. All JI/CDM investors
know this rule.
3) The project host and the project sponsor agree the terms of the JI/CDM
contract.
4) The project sponsor transfers the investment funds as stipulated by the
contract.
5) The project host verifies receipt of respective investment funds and
implements the measures required to generate additional emission
reductions. If the sponsor had not transferred the agreed investment funds,
the project host would not have started to implement the project.
6) If the project host would refrain from implementing the project, he would be
forced by the national environmental authority to pay a punishment equal to
the monetary value of the planned emission credits.
7) Due to incentive-compatibility of this mechanism, both parties abide by the
contract obligations.14
The incentive-compatibility of this arrangement can easily be shown: The project
host, which moves last, has no incentive to behave non-cooperatively, since in this case he
would be forced by the national environmental authority to pay a penalty which makes it
disadvantageous to breach the contract [see conditions (8), (5) and (6)]. Due to this
mechanism, the project sponsor will rightly assume cooperative behaviour on the part of
the host. He abides by the contract, since otherwise the host would refrain from
implementing the project, and the sponsor would not receive any emission credits being
obliged to pay the higher carbon tax.
3.2.2 Self-Commitment of the Project Host through Strategic
Delegation
The fundamental reason of the instability of the JI/CDM contract as analysed in
section 2 is based on the fact that international contracts de facto are difficult to enforce.
On the contrary, contracts at the national level are enforceable by sovereign authorities.
For this reason it is appealing to ask the question if a credible commitment towards a
foreign party could be achieved by making a contract with a third party at the national
level.
More generally, this question may be put as follows: Is it possible to implement
the cooperative outcome of a non-cooperative game by allowing one or both players to
enter into binding contracts with a third or fourth party?
10 This question has been analysed
in recent years within different contexts under the heading "strategic delegation".
11 In the
following, the basic idea of strategic delegation will be applied to the question, if the
project host may be able to commit himself credibly with respect to his international
obligations using strategic delegation. This question will be of importance if the
mechanism discussed in the previous subsection is not functioning effectively for some
reason or another.
                                                          
10 Schelling (1956) and (1960) has advanced this possibility.
11 Strategic delegation has been analysed e.g. in the following contexts: Interrelation between shareholders
and managers in oligopoly markets [Vickers (1985)], industrial economics [Caillaud and Rey (1995)], time
inconsistency of monetary policy [Walsh (1995)], international coordination of national monetary policies
[Dolado, Griffith and Padilla (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1995)]. A general analysis of strategic
delegation is Fershtman, Judd and Kalai (1991).16
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This principal-agent contract meets the agent's participation constraint due to
W W ** * > ‡ 0.
13 The principal's participation constraint is met if
(10) ( ) ( )
* * , , W ‡ -
S H H S H H D D U C C U
This condition requires that the host's pay off in the cooperative outcome of the
JI/CDM game net of the payment to the agent must be higher than his pay off in the non-
cooperative outcome.
14 If the agent would pretend a higher payment, the principal would
not benefit from the strategic delegation.
The entire structure of the proposed mechanism of delegating the JI/CDM project
implementation strategically may be summarised as follows:
a) The project host and his agent make a binding contract regarding the
implementation of the yet to be agreed JI/CDM contract. All potential
project sponsors know the contract.
b) The project sponsor and the project host agree on the terms of the JI/CDM
contract.
c) The project sponsor transfers the investment funds  Q  to the project host.
d) The project host pays his agent the incremental costs of the project
implementation.
e) After having implemented the project, the agent receives his payment  W**.
f) The emission credits generated are transferred to the sponsor who
surrenders them to the national environmental authority in order to get the
carbon tax reimbursement.
                                                          
13 With this specification it is assumed that the reservation utility of the agent is normalised to zero. The
reservation utility represents the utility level of the next best opportunity available to the agent.
14 The relative bargaining power of the agent and the principal determines the precise level of the payment to
the agent within these two participation constraints of the principal-agent contract.17
This structure of both the JI/CDM contract and the principal-agent contract
ensures a credible commitment of the project host and the project sponsor. Both, the
JI/CDM contract and the principal-agent contract are beneficial to all parties involved since
all parties are able to share in the efficiency gains produced by the implementation of the
JI/CDM project considered.
The net benefits resulting from the effective project implementation for the
individual parties are specified as follows:
JI/CDM project sponsor:
(11) 0 > D + Q - T
JI/CDM project host:
(12) 0
* * / > W - - Q
CDM JI C
Agent of the JI/CDM host:
(13) W ** > 0
All parties share in the efficiency gains produced by the implementation of the
JI/CDM project considered.
4. Outlook
International JI and CDM projects may significantly contribute to the cost-
efficient achievement of the emission reduction and limitation targets stipulated by the
Kyoto protocol. However, enforcement problems associated with international contracts
due to state sovereignty may lead to unstable JI and CDM contracts and ultimately prevent
the realisation of potential efficiency gains.18
This paper has analysed this problem adopting a game-theoretic approach. Two
different possible solutions have been proposed, involving sequential moving of contract
parties, punishment by national environmental authorities and strategic delegation.
Further research into the issues dealt with may cover the following question. Is it
conceivable that the punishment mechanism proposed in this paper might be burdened with
credibility problems of the national environmental authority? Which strategies do exist to
remove this conceivable credibility problem? What are further strategies other than those
proposed in this paper available for removing inherent enforcement problems of
international JI and CDM contracts? What are the potentials of cross-default contracts
successfully employed in the field of international debt relations in mitigating enforcement
problems of international climate protection cooperation?
15
                                                          
15 Regarding the concept of cross-default arrangements and its application to international environmental
cooperation see Mohr (1995) and Mohr and Thomas (1998).19
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